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A. A. Krasovskii, N. V. Khabarov, M. Obersteiner
IMPACTS OF THE FAIRLY PRICED REDD-BASED CO2 OFFSET OPTIONS 
ON THE ELECTRICITY PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS1
This paper deals with the modeling of two sectors of a regional economy: electricity and forestry. We show 
that CO2 price will impact not only the profits of the CO2 emitting electricity producer (decrease), but also the 
electricity prices for the consumer (increase), and, hence, some financial instruments might be implemented 
today in order to be prepared for the uncertain CO2 prices in the future. We elaborate financial instrument 
based on the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) mechanism. We model op-
timal behavior of forest owner and electricity producer under uncertainty and determine equilibrium fair 
prices of REDD-based-options.
Keywords: CO2, REDD+, Option Pricing, Optimization, Firm Behavior, Cost Minimizing, Uncertaint 
Introduction
This research is focused on developing finan-
cial instruments supporting activities within 
the framework of the Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus 
(REDD+) program. The basic idea of the program 
is that REDD+ would provide payments to juris-
dictions (countries, states, or provinces) that re-
duce forest emissions below agreed-upon bench-
mark levels2. In a recent review [1] authors discuss 
the potential of REDD+ and show that there are 
many research needs and opportunities for ana-
1 © Krasovskii A. A., Khabarov N. V., Obersteiner M. Text. 2014.
2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
[UNFCCC] 2010, https://unfccc.int/.
lyzing REDD+ policy designs at the global, na-
tional, and subnational levels including examin-
ing land use planning and other applications for 
ongoing REDD+ policy processes. The economic 
modeling tools provided in the literature reflect 
various REDD+ applications, and model the im-
pacts of REDD+ at various scales and dimensions 
for scenarios of future CO2 prices. The fixed market 
models are site-specific and mostly estimate the 
benefits of REDD+ for forests [2]. The partial equi-
librium models are sector specific (forest, agricul-
ture) and focus on particular regions, e.g. [3], in 
long-term perspective 50–100 years. The general 
equilibrium models are economy-wide and near-
er-term (e. g., 20 years) [4]. There are also inte-
grated assessment models which link global econ-
omy and biophysical systems at a very long-run 
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(e.g., at least 100 years) [5]. The variety of mod-
els demonstrates the importance of the problem 
and necessity of developing tools which could al-
low implementing REDD+ in reality (REDD+ is fur-
ther referred to as REDD for the sake of a simpli-
fied notation). 
In our study, we investigate the problem on 
the firm level and consider a microeconomic setup 
with interaction of three players: forest owner, 
electricity producer, and electricity consumer. In 
the model, the regional electricity producer pro-
vides electricity to consumers by running its 
power plants which vary in the employed tech-
nology and costs. The company has market power, 
i.e. the ability to profitably shift prices above com-
petitive levels by demanding a higher price than 
marginal cost, and sets the price for electricity ac-
cording to the demand function of the consumers. 
The economic models of market power applied 
to the electricity markets are presented in part 4 
of the book [6]. The reasons for market power in 
the electricity sector, as well as examples for sev-
eral regions, are discussed in the international re-
view of wholesale electricity markets and genera-
tor’s incentives in [7]. In our study we model mar-
ket power in order to link CO2 prices with electric-
ity prices, and, hence, CO2 prices also impact the 
consumer. The electricity sector is implemented 
in various macroeconomic energy models which 
take into account the impact of CO2 prices as well 
(see a recent review [8]).
An important feature of our study is the short-
term analysis meaning that the electricity pro-
ducer is restricted in his adaptation to uncertain 
CO2 prices: the only options are to modify the pro-
duction process using installed capacities, or raise 
electricity prices and use REDD certificates to offset 
emissions. This creates an incentive to buy REDD 
options to hedge now against uncertain CO2 prices 
in the near future. We assume that the REDD mech-
anism supporting such activities exists [9]. On the 
supply side of the REDD market, we model the for-
est owner who decided to preserve the forest and 
sell respectively generated REDD offsets. Our study 
contributes to research on the potential of using 
REDD options in the energy sector (see for example 
[10], where the real options framework is applied).
The focus of our analysis is on how forest owner 
and electricity producer choose their fair prices for 
different amounts of REDD options. The fair REDD 
option price in the paper is understood in the sense 
of parties’ indifference to whether engage in con-
tracting a given amount of REDD options or not. 
The fair price of electricity producer (forest owner) 
means that for higher (lower) price the electricity 
producer (forest owner) will not want to engage in 
the contract. The idea of fair price is natural for the 
option trading. For example in Chapter 2 in [11] the 
author writes that “fair” (in the context of fair op-
tion price) means that the expected profit for both 
sides of the option contract is 0. Similar idea of fair 
price (rational cost) of options is developed in the 
study, toward the theory of pricing of options [12].
The construction of fair prices in the model is 
based on the transparency of information con-
cerning the emissions generated by the electricity 
producer under different CO2 price scenarios and 
the technological process used in the production. 
We link decision-making of the electricity pro-
ducer and the forest owner, and, hence, construct 
a supply-demand model for the REDD: fair prices 
for every amount of traded REDD options. Under 
assumption of perfect information, we prove the 
existence of the equilibrium amount of options for 
which the fair prices coincide.
The structure of the paper is the following. In 
the first part of the paper, we describe the basic 
model and solve it for the equilibrium electricity 
price in the region by cost-benefit analysis of the 
electricity generation in the absence of emission 
fee — zero CO2 price. The analysis consists of opti-
mizing a technological portfolio and choosing the 
aggregate production output in order to satisfy 
the hourly average demand profile, and to maxi-
mize aggregate profit. Technically, we formulate a 
nonlinear optimization problem and approximate 
it by the appropriate numerical algorithm making 
use of linear programming. 
In the second part, we analyze the impacts of 
CO2 prices on decision-making of the electricity 
producer who will modify technological mixes de-
pending on the emission factors of technologies 
and the value of CO2 price. We consider a short-
term period in which the electricity producer does 
not build new power plants and does not install 
abatement technologies such as carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) modules. The producer opti-
mizes the technology mix in the production pro-
cess and sets electricity prices for the consumers. 
Along these lines we show the impact of growing 
CO2 prices on profits of the electricity producer, 
electricity prices for the consumer and emission 
levels. Thus, rather myopic behavior of a business 
sector is analyzed. Nevertheless, this is a reason-
able approximation of reality where investments 
into power generation are costly and long-term, 
hence very inflexible1.
The third part of the paper is devoted to the 
analysis of financial instruments based on REDD+ 
1 e. g. http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/news/20140331-
Coal-Johnson.html.
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offsets which can be used for hedging in the elec-
tricity sector. We model negotiations of the for-
est owner and electricity producer who choose the 
size of the option and the corresponding price un-
der CO2 price uncertainty. The forest owner keeps 
the forest and is paid for it through the REDD 
mechanism. The electricity producer is interested 
in buying REDD certificates to offset his emissions 
in the future when CO2 prices are introduced. Thus, 
it is assumed that through the REDD mechanism 
the electricity producer can transparently choose 
the amount of certificates they want to trade to-
day. For simplicity we do not consider transfer 
costs and reduce the problem to two groups, as-
suming that on the market they are the same on 
both sides. The problem is divided into two stages: 
at the first stage they fix an amount of options and 
the price, in the second they optimally use REDD 
options in the presence of uncertain CO2 prices. 
The above formulation can be applied to a two-
stage stochastic programming problem with re-
course, pioneered by Dantzig [13]. We provide an 
analysis of several instruments based on REDD off-
sets, and construct supply and demand curves for 
REDD. In the calculation of the expected payoffs 
needed for determining the fair prices, we assume 
that the forest owner knows that the electricity 
producer will maximize the expected profits with 
REDD options and can solve the same problem 
in order to calculate his expected payoff. As the 
fair price is defined based on expected profit value 
only and does not take into account e.g. a distribu-
tion tail, we implicitly assume that both electric-
ity producer and forest owner are risk-neutral. We 
also do not include additional factors to the util-
ity of the forest owner such as opportunity costs 
of the forest, etc., so that his payoff is only the in-
come from REDD offsets. In this modeling frame-
work we show that in the case when electricity 
producer and forest owner possess equal informa-
tion about the CO2 price distribution, the equilib-
rium quantity of REDD options exists and equals 
the minimum amount of emissions correspond-
ing to the maximum CO2 price in the given inter-
val of the bounded discrete distribution. We show 
that larger amounts of options provide an increase 
in emissions, as well as decrease in the electricity 
prices, but in this case the fair price of the forest 
owner is higher than the price of electricity pro-
ducer calling for the necessity of exogenous finan-
cial support to obtain those benefits for both elec-
tricity producer and consumer. Throughout the 
paper, we provide numerical results applied to the 
case study for the model of a region based on re-
alistic data.
1. Model Setup
The model analyzes the decision-making of 
an electricity producer under constraints on the 
available technological capacities and the elec-
tricity demand of the consumers. The electricity 
producer has perfect information concerning the 
costs of his production technologies and the con-
sumers’ demand function. We consider the short-
term period when the capacity for each technol-
ogy is fixed, i.e. the electricity producer operates 
his power plants and does not change their in-
stalled capacities. Variable costs of the electric-
ity production are constant as we do not focus on 
feedbacks between electricity and fuel prices, i.e. 
spark spreads [14].
The decision-making of the electricity pro-
ducer consists of the following steps:
1. Choosing the load factors of his power 
plants in a way which minimizes the costs given 
an hourly electricity demand profile and installed 
technological capacities (lookup table). 
2. Choosing an electricity price to maximize 
the profit based on the demand function indicat-
ing consumer’s sensitivity to electricity prices.
3. Modeling with CO2 prices.
4. Modeling with buying options on REDD 
offsets.
In this section, we sequentially formulate and 
solve two optimization problems arising in the 
steps 1-2. Throughout the paper, we provide nu-
merical results for a case-study in order to illus-
trate the model. The case-study does not describe 
a real region of the world, but simulates an artifi-
cial region having realistic features in the frame-
work of the model assumptions.
1.1. Optimal Mix of Technologies
A simple model of a power plant categorizes all 
costs into two components: fixed costs and vari-
able costs [15]. Fixed costs include capital costs, 
taxes, insurance, and any fixed operations and 
maintenance costs that will be incurred even 
when the plant is not operated. Variable costs are 
the added costs associated with running the plant 
including fuel plus operations and maintenance 
costs. Technically, it means that the cost function 
for each technology in the model is linear with re-
spect to the amount of generated electricity.
The technologies used by the regional elec-
tricity producer and their costs are taken from the 
book [15]. We choose technologies based on coal 
and gas (which generate CO2 emissions) in order 
to provide an incentive for the producer to hedge 
against uncertain CO2 prices [16]. In our example 
the regional electricity producer has power plants 
with the following technologies: coal (pulverized 
coal steam), combustion turbine (natural-gas–
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fired) and combined cycle (CCGT). The corre-
sponding fixed and variable costs, as well as the 
installed capacities, (in MW) for the case-study are 
presented in Table 1. The total installed capacity 
is the maximum of electricity that the electricity 
producer can generate using his power plants with 
given technologies. The size of installed capacities 
is chosen to illustrate a model at a regional scale.
To construct an economically efficient pro-
duction plan the electricity producer has to de-
cide what combination of technologies to use dur-
ing the day in order to satisfy the hourly demand 
profile. A demand profile for an average day of the 
year is depicted on Fig. 1 and illustrates the elec-
tricity consumption during each hour of the day. It 
is chosen to be consistent with the regional pro-
files provided in the literature [17–19]. The val-
ues are consistent with the installed capacities of 
the electricity producer. The hourly demand usu-
ally has peaks during the average day, which lead 
to a problem of choosing a rational combination 
of technologies in the production process. To sim-
plify the case-study we take the hourly average de-
mand as a fixed time slice and keep it the same for 
each day of the longer period, e.g. one year. This 
simplification allows us to link the hourly profile 
with aggregate demand, and to assume that the 
change in aggregate demand leads to the propor-
tional shifts in every hour of the profile for an av-
erage day. This assumption seems to be a reason-
able simplification in the short-term dynamics of 
the electricity production considered in the paper.
Let us denote the installed capacities by ai, 
i = 1, ..., N, where is the index of the technology, is 
the number of technologies, by the corresponding 
variable costs, and by dj, j = 1, ..., T, where index 
stands for the hour of the day, T = 24, the hourly 
demand profile. The fixed costs cannot be changed 
and we aggregate them in one variable summariz-
ing all technologies denoted by TFC. Total fixed 
cost is used to calculate profits. The first optimi-
zation problem for the electricity producer is for-
mulated as follows.
Problem 1a. Find hourly capacity factors xij sat-
isfying the daily demand dj with minimum pro-
duction cost:
Table 1
Technological data for the case-study, based on [15, 24]
Index of 
technology, i Technology
Annual fixed cost, 







1 Coal-fired steam cycle 224 18.9 3800 1.02
2 Natural gas-fired combustion turbine 64 55.6 1900 0.3
3 Natural-gas–fired combined cycle 96 39 2200 0.514
Fig. 1. Hourly average demand profile
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Hourly capacity factors are the control varia-
bles in this problem. The solution to this linear 
programming problem for our case-study, N = 3, 
is presented on Fig. 2. The plots indicate hourly 
capacity factors for each technology on an aver-
age day. Coal-fired plants are expensive to build, 
but relatively cheap to operate, so they should be 
run more or less continuously as base load plants. 
Single-cycle gas turbines are relatively inexpen-
sive to build but expensive to operate. They are 
mostly used at peaking power plants, turned on 
only during periods of high demand. Combined 
cycle turbine has characteristics in between, and 
is used to cover the intermediate load.
Our model provides a higher level of abstrac-
tion than the unit commitment (UC) problem –an 
optimization problem used to determine the op-
eration schedule of the generating units at every 
hour interval with varying loads under different 
constraints and environments [20]. Namely, we 
do not take into account such details as start-up 
and shut-down costs for individual units of the 
generator and additional constraints which lead 
to mixed-integer linear programming formula-
tions. Also we simplify the model to the static case 
where the average daily demand is considered (not 
focusing on day-to-day market fluctuations).
Fig. 2. Optimal capacity factors in the absence of CO2 price
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1.2. Market Power of the Electricity Producer
We assume that the electricity producer has 
market power in the region. There is evidence of 
regional market power in the electricity sector 
discussed in papers [7, 21]. This means that the 
electricity producer has the possibility of setting 
a price for electricity above their marginal cost 
[6]. In the model, the consumers respond to the 
change in electricity prices according to an aggre-
gate demand function:
Q = D(Pe)                             (3)
here Pe denotes the electricity price, Q stands for 
aggregate electricity consumption, D(P) is the de-
mand function.
Further, we assume that the hourly average de-
mand profile is proportional to the aggregate de-
mand, i.e. when the aggregate demand shifts from 





,  ,  ,jj d j d j
j j
d Q
d Q Y d Q Y d
Q = =
= = =∑ ∑         (4)
where Yd stands for the number of days in the 
aggregation interval, e.g. one year. As we take it 
as an average profile we put Yd = 1 in the formula-
tion of the optimization problems below. In order 
to find the optimal solution to the profit maximi-
zation problem, a monopolist first has to calculate 
his cost function, which is the minimum cost of 
producing every feasible output Q. The cost func-
tion C(Q) is generated by optimal mixes of tech-
nologies (solution to (1)-(2)) for the hourly aver-
age profile (time slice) dj corresponding to aggre-
gate outputs Q (4). Given the cost function C(Q) 
the electricity producer with market power solves 
the second optimization problem.
Problem 1b. Choose the optimal aggregate out-
put and set corresponding price to maximize the 
profit:
( ) ( ) ( ) max,1
Q
Q QD Q C Q-π = - →           (5)
D–1 denotes the inverse demand function.
The demand function in the form of:
( )1 ,eP D Q AQ- α= =                       (6)
where A — positive constant, α — elasticity of de-
mand, is used in the model. Thus, to calibrate the 
aggregate demand we apply the log-linear model 
that is most commonly employed in aggregate en-
ergy demand studies [22], i.e. we use a constant 
elasticity demand curve. According to Bohi [22] 
there is no obvious evidence that the more com-
plex forms of demand are superior. The log-linear 
specifications are preferred in the literature, be-
cause they can be adapted to sufficiently well re-
flect the demand and are implemented in a wide 
range of models. The coefficients of the aggre-
gate demand function in our model are calibrated 
in such a way that a realistic electricity price of 
Europe1 is achieved in the solution to an optimi-
zation problem (5). For this purpose, one can ap-
ply the necessary condition for profit maximiza-
tion: marginal cost equals marginal revenue [23]. 
On Fig. 3 the computed approximation of the mar-
ginal cost function for our case-study is presented, 
whose step-wise shape is generated by optimal 
technological mixes.
The parameters of the demand function (6), 
calibrated to achieve 90.5eP =  USD/M. What 
profit’s maximum are estimated on the follow-
ing levels: 3104.8 0 ,1A = ×  0.612.α = -  The value 
of elasticity coefficient, |α| < 1, indicates that 
the demand function is inelastic. The plot of the 
profit function is presented in Fig. 4 and shows 
that it is a concave function with one maximum. 
Let us denote by Q0 the profit maximizing quan-
tity and by 0jd  the corresponding hourly profile. 
These values will provide the basis for the model 
development below and serve for comparison of 
outcomes. In our example the profit maximiz-
ing quantity is 0 100.47Q =  GWh, and the corre-
sponding profit is ( )0 3.56Qπ =  mln USD. Further, 
we will show how the electricity producer adjusts 
his technological mixes and sets the electricity 
price with respect to CO2 prices, and compare the 
outcomes for different CO2 prices. For this pur-
pose, in the following section we provide the for-
mal profit-maximization problem, and later ap-
proximate it by two step optimization algorithm 
similar to what we did in this section by solving 
sequentially Problems 1a-1b.
2. Modeling with CO2 Prices
In this section we show how the optimal tech-
nology mix and electricity price will change in the 
presence of CO2 prices. In this paper we assume 
that the electricity producer is emitting CO2 and 
only consider such producers, i.e. the modeling 
described here is not applicable to those who have 
only carbon neutral technologies, e.g. hydropower 
or nuclear. The electricity production process pro-
vides an externality in terms of CO2 emissions gen-
erated by fuels used in the production. The emis-
sion factors used to calculate tons of CO2 equiv-
alent per MWh of electricity production by each 
technology are based on [24]. Obviously, there is a 
range of values for each technology. For presently 
operating, coal-fired power plants the cumulative 
1 See Quarterly Reports On European Electricity Markets http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/electricity/electricity_en.htm.
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emissions range between 950 and 1250 gCO2 eq/
kWh. The emissions from gas-fired power plants 
according to the literature range from 360 and 575 
gCO2 eq/kWh. In our study we take values from in-
dicated intervals given in Table 1. 
The impact of CO2 prices on the electricity gen-
eration can be estimated by an increase in the var-
iable cost of each technology. Additional variable 
costs increase the cost of the aggregate production 
and impact the profits. Thus, the electricity pro-
ducer will modify his strategy, to find an optimal 
response to any CO2 price. As the electricity pro-
ducer will also try to compensate loses by increas-
ing electricity prices, the consumers will react by 
reducing the consumption according to their de-
mand function. Let us denote emissions factors by 
ϵi and CO2 price by the symbol p
c. In Table 2 we 
present variables and notations for the model with 
CO2 prices. For every CO2 price one can formulate 
the following optimization problem.











i ij i ij
i j i j
N
c
i i i ij x
i j
a x D a x
v p a x
-
= = = =
= =
 
× -  
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∑ ∑ ∑ ∑













≥ ≤ ≤∑             (8)
Here Q 0 is the optimal aggregate production in 
the absence of CO2 price, and 
0
jd  is correspond-
ing hourly profile (solution to Problems 1a-1b), 
i.e. they are solutions to Problem 2 when pc = 0. 
In this way we guarantee the consistency between 
Problems 1a-1b and 2.
Problem 2 is nonlinear due to the possibility of 
varying the production output in the inverse de-
mand function ( )( )1 ijD Q x-  (6). In the next section 
a description of the numerical algorithm is pro-
vided. The algorithm allows us to solve numeri-
cally optimization problems arising further in the 
paper using the linear programming technique.
2.1.	 The	Profit	Maximization	Algorithm
Let the feasible aggregate production outputs 
be given by K discrete value   ,  1,.., .kQ k K=  The 
profit maximization problem for any fixed CO2 
price pc is solved in following steps:
1. Find the optimal mix of technologies and 
corresponding cost ( );k kC C Q=
2. Calculate electricity prices ( )1ek kP D Q-=  
and corresponding revenues ;ek k kR Q P=
3. Calculate profits ;k k kR Cπ = -
4. Find maximum profit max ,ˆ kkπ = π  and hence 
corresponding quantity Qˆ, emissions Eˆ and elec-
tricity price Pˆ e.
The algorithm is implemented in R, the soft-
ware environment for statistical computing and 
graphics1, using the “linprog” package2. In Fig. 5 
1 http://www.r-project.org/
2 http://linprog.r-forge.r-project.org/
Fig. 3. Marginal cost curve of the electricity producer as approximated by model runs and generated by optimal technological 
mixes satisfying the hourly demand
280 совремеННый иНструмеНтарий...
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА № 3 (2014)
Table 2
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1 1 1 1 1 1
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i j i j i j
Q a x D a x v a x FC Profit without emission fee, USD
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )π = - = π -0 cQ R Q C Q Q p E Q Profit function, USD
Fig. 4. Profit function in the model
one can see how the optimal technological mixes 
change with the increase of the CO2 price. The 
technologies are switching as their variable costs 
increase with higher CO2 prices.
For every price pc, we find the maximum 
profit πˆ(p c) and corresponding optimal emis-
sions Eˆ(pc). Results of modeling are given on Fig. 
6 for nine discrete values of CO2 prices from 0 
to 80 USD per ton CO2. Obviously, the highest 
profit πˆ(0) = πˆ(p c = 0) = 3.56 mln USD and emis-
sions level Eˆ(0) = 93 Mt CO2 are achieved in the ab-
sence of CO2 price. These values as well as produc-
tion output decrease with respect to growing CO2 
prices. One can see that the electricity producer 
will transfer some of his loses from the CO2 prices 
on customers — electricity price is growing from 
Pˆ e(0) = 90.5 USD/MWh to Pˆ e(80) = 204 USD/MWh. 
The minimum profit, production and emission 
levels are achieved at the maximum CO2 price in 
the interval: πˆ(80) = 0.07 mln USD, Qˆ(80) = 26.66 
GWh and Eˆ(80) = 8 Mt CO2.The nonlinearities of 
the optimal functions with respect to CO2 prices 
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Fig. 5. Technology mixes with respect to CO2 price
are explained by the possibilities of switching be-
tween technologies which results in a nonlinear 
shape of the marginal cost function which is con-
structed for each CO2 price.
3. Instruments Supporting REDD
In this section, we model the fair prices of REDD 
options chosen by the forest owner and electricity 
producer. The fair REDD option price in the paper 
is understood in the sense of parties’ indifference 
to whether engage in contracting a given amount 
of REDD options or not. Such notion of fair or ra-
tional price is similar to the one used in the theory 
of options trading [11, 12]. We assume that in the 
case of CO2 prices appearing in the future the elec-
tricity producer may let the REDD offsets option 
contracts with forest owner. These REDD offsets 
are accepted in and, hence, are part of a bigger CO2 
market influenced by other players — on the de-
mand (emitters) side — industries including steel, 
transportation, construction — and on the supply 
side — policymakers providing emission permits. 
In this wider market, those emitters who are able 
to efficiently reduce their emissions might sell 
some of their permits on the market. The simpli-
fying assumption we make is that the REDD op-
tions contracts do not impact the «bigger» market, 
or their potential impact is included in the uncer-
tain future CO2 price.
3.1. Modeling of REDD Options under 
Uncertainty
In our model, the electricity producer and for-
est owner are both risk neutral — they do not have 
any risk preferences in terms of their utility func-
tions, and thus we deal only with expected payoffs 
for each player. The future values of CO2 prices are 
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uncertain, and for the simplified modeling we as-
sume that the CO2 price at the second stage is a 
random variable with the discrete distribution 
{ }
1





p w l M w
=
= … =∑  where 0,1lw ∈    
stands for the probability of the CO2 price .
c
lp
The interaction between the electricity pro-
ducer and forest owner is split into two stages:
1) at the first stage the forest owner and elec-
tricity producer choose for any amount E 0 of REDD 
options the price of these options under CO2 price 
uncertainty;
2) at the second stage they face a realiza-
tion p c of previously unknown CO2 market price 
and calculate their payoffs. The electricity pro-
ducer can optimize their production and use the 
amount of options, they bought in the first period, 
to offset what they will emit, the rest must be re-
turned to the forest owner at the negotiated price 
, 0 1,cp pδ = δ ≤ δ ≤  which is the discounted market 
price.
In fact, electricity producer and forest owner 
get shares of the market price i.e. δ and (1 – δ) re-
spectively, so that:
— If δ = 1, the electricity producer has a right to 
sell the option in the second period at the market 
price.
— If δ = 0, the electricity producer can only 
use REDD credits to offset the factual amount 
of their emissions and the unused credits are re-
turned(without compensation) back to the forest 
owner i.e. no resale by electricity producer is pos-
sible on the market (as pδ = 0).
— If 0 < δ < 1 the electricity producer faces a 
trade-off between emitting more and hence using 
more of the contracted REDD options for offset-
ting their emissions versus sharing the profit with 
the forest owner from selling the offsets at the 
market price.
By definition, for any amount E 0 of REDD op-
tions, the corresponding fair price of the elec-
tricity producer (or forest owner) should provide 
the same expected profit for electricity producer 
(or forest owner) as it would be without engaging 
into the REDD options contract, i.e. if forest owner 
were selling offsets on the market and if electricity 
producer were buying offsets on the market.
The modeled financial instrument has common 
traits with both traditional options and forwards, 
but is distinctive. It is an «option» in the sense that 
an emitter has the right (but not obligation) to use 
any amount of offsets not exceeding the contracted 
volume. It is a «forward» in the sense that there is 
no payment required upfront (only in the future) — 
so no price for the «option» as such. It has also the 
benefit sharing mechanism for not consumed off-
sets between the buyer and the seller, which does 
not directly relate to «option» nor «forward».
The existence of REDD options at the second 
stage of the model leads to modifications in the 
optimization of production costs (see the origi-
nal formula in Table 2). Namely, the variable cost 
function changes in the following way:
24 24
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where { }max ,0 ,x x+ =    meaning that the elec-
tricity producer can offset their emissions up to 
the amount E 0 by using REDD+ options, and the 
rest is sold to the forest owner at the price pδ.
Hence, decision-making with REDD options 
consists in choosing between two alternative 
cost-minimization problems.
Problem 3.1. Minimize cost when emissions are 
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Problem 3.2. Minimize cost when emissions are 
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Problems 3.1–3.2 present two option sat the 
second stage: to emit more than E 0 (the amount 
contracted via REDD options at the first stage) and 
then pay the market price for the excess of emis-
sions, or to emit less than E 0 and receive the dis-
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counted price for the saved emissions. In the first 
case the forest owner does not receive any part 
of the REDD offsets back, in the second case the 
forest owner receives a part of the offsets and re-
sells them at the market price. In other words, the 
electricity producer and forest owner share the in-
come from unused options and their shares are 
determined by parameter δ.
For any fixed value of E 0, the Problem 3.1 al-
ways has a feasible solution, while problem 3.2 
could be unsolvable for some values E 0 due to con-
flicting constraints on minimum production (14) 
and maximum emission (15). In this case solu-
tion to Problem 3.1 is taken as the cost-minimiz-
ing solution. In the case when both problems have 
feasible solutions we choose the solution provid-
ing minimum cost:
{ }min0 1 2, ,V V V=                    (16)
by choosing between V1 (10) and V2 (13), and take 
the corresponding control variable (technological 
mix) as the optimal at the second stage.
After constructing the modified costs V 0 at the 
second stage for a fixed value of E 0, the electric-
ity producer solves profit-maximizing problem 
following steps 2-5 in the algorithm described in 
section 2.1.
3.2. The Fair Prices of REDD Options
In this section, we provide a formal definition 
of the fair prices of REDD options which are de-
termined by the expected payoffs of the electricity 
producer and forest owner. We assume that they 
both have perfect information about the techno-
logical capacities and costs, i.e. the forest owner 
knows that the electricity producer will solve the 
optimization problem discussed in the previous 
section and possesses the data to solve the same 
problem. Given that the electricity producer and 
forest owner face the same distribution of the CO2 
price at the second stage, they solve the same op-
timization problem, but with different focuses. 
While the electricity producer is interested in the 
expected profit, the payoff of the forest owner is 
based on the expected emissions returned by the 
electricity producer at the second stage. Let us 
note that we are not taking into account addi-
tional factors in the payoff of the forest owner, e.g. 
opportunity costs from the cutting and selling the 
forest, etc. It could be the case that those costs are 
not comparable with the benefits from REDD or 
the forest owner decided to keep the forest exclu-
sively for the REDD offsets. The described frame-
work allows us to construct the demand and sup-
ply curves for REDD options: fair prices for each 
amount of options, and find the equilibrium quan-
tity where the curves intersect.
For each CO2 price  
c
ip  appearing at the sec-
ond stage we introduce the following notations. 
We denote by ( )ˆ clpπ  the maximized profit with-
out REDD (E 0 = 0) calculated as the solution to 
Problem 2. Let us denote by the symbol ( )ˆ cR lpπ  
the maximized profit with REDD, and by the sym-
bol ( ) ( )0ˆ ˆct l RE p E E x
+
 = -   the corresponding op-
timal amount of emissions returned to the for-
est owner (solution to (9)). These values are cal-
culated according to the algorithm described 
in the Section 2.1 with modifications in step 1 
which should take into account the procedure of 
cost minimization with REDD options (16). In the 
Table 3 one can find formulas for the correspond-
ing expected values which are used in the model 
with uncertainty.
The electricity producer wants his expected 
profit to stay the same no matter if he buys op-
tions or not. Denoting his desirable price by the 
symbol pG, one gets the following equation:
0
R Gp Eπ = π - .                          (17)
The forest owner has two alternatives:
1. do nothing in the first period and sell the 
amount E 0 in the second period at theexpected 
market price ;cp
2. sell the amount E 0 at price pF in the first pe-
riod, buy the expected amount Et at price δp
c and 
resell it at the market price in the second period.
Based on the desired equivalence of those two 
alternatives, the fair price for the forest owner pF is 
determined by the equation:
( )0 0c c ct FE p E p p p E= -δ + .             (18)
Based on the equations (17)–(18) one can for-
mulate the definition for fair prices.
Definition. For a given discount , 0 1,δ ≤ δ ≤  an-
damount of options E 0 the fair prices for the elec-
tricity producer pG and forest owner pF are calcu-
lated as follows:
Table 3
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One can see that fair prices are calculated dif-
ferently: the electricity producer is interested in 
its expected profits while the forest owner takes 
care of the emissions expected to be returned back 
to them in the second period (as they determine 
their profits). An important parameter in the for-
mulas is the amount of contracted options E 0, 
which determines the corresponding fair prices. 
Finally, for the fixed parameter δ, the equations 
(19)–(20) represent demand and supply curves for 
REDD options.
3.3. Modeling Results
Experiments are carried out for the discrete ap-
proximation of a uniform price distribution:
( )10 1clp l= - ,
1
lw M
= , 1,.., .l M=         (21)
The range of prices, M = 9, is taken from mode-
ling results in Section 2. Sizes of REDD-based op-
tion contracts used in the model are taken from 
the range determined by the optimal emissions 
generated by the electricity producer: from 8 Mt 
CO2 to 83.5 Mt CO2(see Fig. 6).Below we consider 
different values of parameter δ which determines 
the proportion ofsharing the CO2 price.
The supply-demand curves for REDD options 
are presented in Fig. 7. They show that if both 
electricity producers and forest owners have a 
Fig. 6. Optimal electricity production, electricity price, emissions, and profits with respect to CO2 price
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common view on the distributions of future CO2 
price, the equilibrium quantity exists, which cor-
responds to the minimum emissions of the elec-
tricity producer expected at the second stage. This 
amount corresponds to the maximum expected 
CO2 price — the right-hand side boundary of the 
discrete CO2 price interval Eˆ(p
c = 80) = 8 Mt CO2. 
The equilibrium fair price in this case is the mean 
expected market price pF = pG = p
c = 40 USD/ton. 
For any amount of options larger than the mini-
mum value, the fair price of the forest owner (20) 
is higher than the fair price of the electricity pro-
ducer (19). The magnitude of the gap between fair 
prices depends on the value of the parameter δ: for 
larger δ the gap is smaller.
If δ = 1, the forest owner and electricity producer 
will always negotiate the same price pF = pG = p
c, 
as in this case it effectively implies the possibility 
to sell any amount of offsets at the market price 
at the second stage by any party. The equality also 
follows from the equations (19)–(20). This is a de-
generate case in the sense that the technology 
mixis not affected as well as the electricity prices 
for the consumer.
On Fig. 7 (lower panel), we show the expected 
percentage of unused REDD offsets that are sold 
on the market by the electricity producer for se-
lected values of δ when the producer initially pur-
chases a certain amount at their respective fair 
price. The higher the share δ of the electricity pro-
ducer in the profit from selling those offsets on 
the market is, the more he decides to not use them 
for his own emissions offsetting and sells them 
instead at the second stage. When parameter δ 
equals zero, the electricity producer does not re-
turn any of options to the forest owner.
In Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, one can see the impact of op-
tions on the expected electricity prices and emis-
sions with respect to the amount of contracted 
REDD-based options for δ = 0.5. Results show 
that in the case of larger amounts E 0 > 8 Mt CO2 
of REDD-based options the electricity producers 
will increase their expected emissions (keeping 
their expected profits on the same level), and by 
doing so will be able to reduce the electricity price. 
For example, if the electricity producer could buy 
REDD options of the volume 83.5 Mt CO2 for his 
fair price pG = 28.87 USD/ton (which is less than 
pF = 33.11 USD/ton, see Fig. 7), then the expected 
emissions would be 67.56 Mt CO2 instead of 43.38 
Mt CO2, (Fig. 9) and the expected electricity price 
would be 115.8 USD/MWh versus 147.3 USD/MWh 
(Fig. 8). Apparently, somebody would have to pay 
for this positive effect (for electricity consumer) as 
the fair prices of the forest owner are higher than 
what producer is willing to pay (see Fig. 7).


















Fig. 7. Upper panel: Fair prices of electricity producer and forest owner (y-axis) for a contracted amount of REDD offsets (x-axis) for 
a sample CO2 price distribution. Lower panel: share of the REDD options used by the electricity producer and returned to the forest 
owner in the second stage of the model
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Fig. 8. Expected electricity price with options bought by electricity producer at their «fair» price (δ = 0.5) vs. without
Fig. 9. Expected emissions with options bought by electricity producer at their «fair» price (δ = 0.5) vs. without
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a partial equilib-
rium microeconomic model of the interaction of 
the electricity producer, forest owner and electric-
ity consumer. We illustrated how the optimal de-
cision of the electricity producer changes in the 
short term when a CO2 price for emissions is intro-
duced. The electricity producer adjusts its capac-
ity factors of technologies, reduces the production 
and partially delegates the CO2 price to the con-
sumer by charging a higher electricity price. Due 
to the nonlinearities in the marginal cost func-
tion constructed for each CO2 price the dependen-
cies of the optimal profits, emissions and electric-
ity prices with respect to growing CO2prices are 
nonlinear. In order to introduce the potential role 
of REDD as a hedging instrument we consider a 
two stage stochastic optimization model with un-
certainty about future CO2 prices. We analyze ne-
gotiations of the forest owner and electricity pro-
ducer on the amount of REDD-based options and 
their fair prices under assumption of fully open in-
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formation on profits/emissions of producer and a 
common view on a future CO2 price distribution. 
To construct supply-demand curves for REDD op-
tions we employ a uniform distribution of the CO2 
price. We show that there is an equilibrium quan-
tity for which fair prices coincide — the supply 
and demand curves intersect. For larger amounts 
of options higher emissions can be generated by 
the electricity producer leading to lower electric-
ity prices for consumers. These positive impacts 
need additional money to fill in the gap between 
fair prices of forest owner and electricity producer.
Further possible developments of the study 
are connected with implementation of additional 
factors into the model. Namely, additional proce-
dures can be implemented to calculate the costs of 
electricity production which are based on the fuel 
prices. The green energy companies as well as nu-
clear generators influencing the electricity price 
can also be implemented in the model. From the 
electricity demand side one can investigate the 
possibility of a dynamic hourly demand with the 
market power of the producer at particular hours 
in order to avoid the assumption of proportional 
changes. Also feedbacks on the consumer side can 
be analyzed, e.g. demand response to electric cars, 
green technologies, etc. The latter are connected 
with extending the model to a long-term analysis. 
One should also mention that the use of variable 
costs and emission factors in the study provides 
the flexibility for implementing various technolo-
gies into the model.
In the model of fair prices, and corresponding 
supply and demand curves for REDD options one 
could introduce a more sophisticated utility of the 
forest owner, e.g. including forest management 
costs, etc. Further model developments could be 
made by introducing heterogeneous forest own-
ers and electricity producers. One could also per-
form the sensitivity analysis with respect to dif-
ferent distributions of CO2 prices and consider 
the cases when the electricity producer and forest 
owner face different distributions. The model with 
two different electricity producers and forest own-
ers could already lead to interesting problems of 
searching for the equilibrium fair prices.
Although the current mode is based on sev-
eral simplified assumptions, from the method-
ological point of view it provides useful insights 
and creates the basis for future research. The re-
sults provided in the paper are consistent with the 
literature on modeling the electricity sector and 
REDD. They propose a relevant financial instru-
ment contributing to the REDD mechanism. This 
instrument is flexible enough due to possibility of 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter 
δ ∈ [0, 1]. It supports REDD, and provides a poten-
tial for reducing risk — softens CO2 price impacts 
on regional electricity producers and consumers.
This research has received funding from the project «Options Market and Risk-Reduction Tools for REDD+» funded by the 
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation under agreement number QZA-0464 QZA-13/0074. We are grateful to Dr. Wolf 
Heinrich Reuter for comments and discussions.
References
1. Lubowski, R. N. & Rose S. K. (2013). The Potential for REDD+: Key Economic Modeling Insights and Issues.  Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy,  7, 67–90.
2. Benítez, P. C. & Obersteiner M. (2006). Site identification for carbon sequestration in Latin America: A grid-based economic 
approach.  For Policy Econ , 8, 636–651.
3. Busch, J, Lubowski, R. N., Godoy, F., Steininger, M., Yusuf, A.A., Austin, K., Hewson, J., Juhn, D., Farid, M. & Boltz, F. (2012). 
Structuring economic incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation within Indonesia.  Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences , 109, 1062–1067.
4. Golub, A., Hertel, T., Lee, H-L., Rose, S. & Sohngen, B. (2009). The opportunity cost of land use and the global potential for 
greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture and forestry.  Resource and Energy Economics,  31, 299–319.
5. Bosetti, V., Lubowski, R., Golub, A. & Markandya, A. (2011). Linking reduced deforestation and a global carbon market: 
implications for clean energy technology and policy flexibility.  Environment and Development Economics , 16, 479–505.
6. Stoft, S. (2002).  Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity.  Piscataway, NJ: New York: IEEE Press ; Wiley-
Interscience, 468.
7. Hunt, L. C. & Evans, J. (2009).  International Handbook on the Economics of Energy.  Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar, 831.
8. Krey, V. (2014). Global energy-climate scenarios and models: a review: Global energy-climate scenarios and models.  Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment,  3, 363–383.
9. Obersteiner, M., Huettner, M., Kraxner, F., McCallum, I., Aoki, K., Böttcher, H., Fritz, S., Gusti, M., Havlik, P., Kindermann, G., 
Rametsteiner, E. & Reyers, B. (2009). On fair, effective and efficient REDD mechanism design.  Carbon Balance and Management , 
4, 1-11.
10. Fuss, S., Szolgayova, J., Golub, A. & Obersteiner, M. (2010). Options on low-cost abatement and investment in the energy 
sector: new perspectives on REDD.  Environment and Development Economics , 16, 507–525.
11. Weert, F. de (2013).  An Introduction to Options Trading . Hoboken, N. J.: Wiley, 176.
288 совремеННый иНструмеНтарий...
ЭКОНОМИКА РЕГИОНА № 3 (2014)
12. Shiryaev, A. N., Kabanov, Y. M., Kramkov, O. D., Melnikov, A. V. (1995). Toward the Theory of Pricing of Options of Both 
European and American Types. I. Discrete time.  Theory of Probability and Its Applications,  39, 14–60.
13. Dantzig, G. B. (1955). Linear Programming under Uncertainty.  Management Science,  1, 197–206.
14. Cassano, M. & Sick, G. (2013). Valuation of a spark spread: an LM6000 power plant.  European Journal of Finance,   19, 
689–714.
15. Masters, G. M. (2004).  Renewable and Efficient Electric Power Systems.  Wiley, 680.
16. Szolgayová, J., Fuss, S., Khabarov, N. & Obersteiner, M. (2011). Robust Energy Portfolios Under Climate Policy and 
Socioeconomic Uncertainty.  Environmental Modeling & Assessment,  17, 39–49.
17. Andersen, F. M., Larsen, H. V. & Boomsma, T. K. (2013). Long-term forecasting of hourly electricity load: Identification of 
consumption profiles and segmentation of customers.  Energy Conversion and Management,  68, 244–252.
18. Bigerna, S., BOLLINO, C. A. (2013).  Hourly Electricity Demand in Italian Market. Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, 
Finanza e Statistica.  Universita di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia, Finanza e Statistica, 24.
19. Stokes, M., Rylatt, M. & Lomas, K. (2004). A simple model of domestic lighting demand.  Energy Build  36, 103–116.
20. Saravanan, B., Das, S., Sikri, S. & Kothari, D. P. (2013). A solution to the unit commitment problem—a review.   Front 
Energy,  7, 223–236.
21. Janssen M, Wobben M: Electricity pricing and market power-evidence from Germany.   Eur Trans Electr Power   2009, 
19:591–611.
22. Bohi, D. R. (2013).  Analyzing Demand Behavior: A Study of Energy Elasticities.  Routledge, 177 .
23. Varian, H. R. (2009).  Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach.  New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 780.
24. Weisser, D. (2007). A guide to life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from electric supply technologies.  Energy,  32, 
1543–1559.
Information about the authors
Krasovskii Andrey Andreyevich (Laxenburg, Austria) — PhD, Research Scholar of Ecosystems Services and Management 
Program (ESM), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (1, Schlossplatz, Laxenburg A-2361, Austria, e-mail: 
krasov@iiasa.ac.at).
Khabarov Nikolay Vasil'evich (Laxenburg, Austria) — PhD, Research Scholar of Ecosystems Services and Management 
Program (ESM), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (1, Schlossplatz, Laxenburg A-2361, Austria, e-mail: 
khabarov@iiasa.ac.at).
Obersteiner Michael (Laxenburg, Austria) — PhD, Program Director of Ecosystems Services and Management Program 
(ESM), International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (1, Schlossplatz, Laxenburg A-2361, Austria, e-mail: oberstei@
iiasa.ac.at). 
УДК 332.14; 519.86; 519.83
А. Ф. Шориков, Л. А. Коршунов 
ЭКОНОМИКО-МАТЕМАТИЧЕСКАЯ МОДЕЛЬ ДВУХУРОВНЕВОГО 
МИНИМАКСНОГО ПРОГРАММНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ 
ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬЮ РЕГИОНА1
В данной статье рассматривается дискретная динамическая система, состоящая из набора 
управляемых объектов (региона и образующих его муниципалитетов), динамика каждого из кото-
рых описывается соответствующим векторным линейным дискретным рекуррентным соотноше-
нием при наличии управляемых параметров и возмущений (рисков). В системе выделены два уровня 
принятия управленческих решений — доминирующий (региональный или первый уровень) и подчи-
ненный (муниципальный, или второй уровень), имеющие различные критерии функционирования и 
объединенные между собой априори определенными информационными и управленческими связями. 
Рассматривается задача оптимизации управления экономической безопасностью региона при на-
личии рисков. Для исследуемой задачи в данной работе предлагается экономико-математическая 
модель двухуровневого иерархического минимаксного программного управления экономической безо-
пасностью региона при наличии рисков и общая схема ее решения. 
Ключевые слова: экономико-математическая модель, экономическая безопасность региона, дискрет-
ная динамическая система, двухуровневая иерархическая система управления, минимаксное программное 
управление
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